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Abstract
Beginning from the nineteenth century, Arab-Muslim intelligentsias
marched to reform their societies. Many things since then have been carried
out. They put forward various proposals, advanced numerous ideas and concepts
and established several institutions. Nevertheless, their condition has yet
improved. In some context, it even deteriorates. Triggered by this situation, a
number of  Arab and Muslim scholars then embark on a new reform project.
But at this time, their reform attempt is materialized in the form of  intellectual
and cultural project. For they believe that the basic problem and crisis beset
their society lies in their understanding of  turâts. Thus, unless this understanding
is corrected, no genuine reform would be able to be materialized. Muhammad
‘Abid al-Jabiri, a Moroccan scholar, is one of  the many Arab scholars who
have taken this course. For this purpose, he constructed his own project which
he names Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi. This article specifically attempts to shed light on
conceptual apparatus and methods that he uses which this study finds to have
originated from different schools of thought of western philosophy and social
sciences, important of which is Marxism and postmodernism.
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Abstrak
Sejak abad ke 19, kaum intelektual Arab Muslim telah mencoba untuk
memperbaharui kondisi masyarakat mereka. Untuk tujuan tersebut, banyak yang
telah mereka lakukan. Mereka mengajukan beberapa gagasan dan usulan; mereka
juga membangun lembaga-lembaga tertentu untuk merealisasikan ide mereka.
Namun pembaharuan tersebut sepertinya belum membawa perubahan
siginifikan. Realitas malah menunjukkan sebaliknya. Kondisi masyarakat Arab-
Muslim bertambah memilukan. Didorong oleh kondisi inilah, makanya beberapa
kaum intelektual Arab-Muslim kembali mencoba menggagas proyek
pembaharuan mereka. Namun kali ini dalam bentuk proyek intelektual, karena
mereka percaya bahwa akar krisis ini terletak pada persoalan cara pandang
orang Arab terhadap turâts mereka. Selama pemahaman mereka terhadap turâts
ini tidak diperbaharui, maka pembaharuan akan sulit bisa terealisasikan.
Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri, pemikir asal Maroko, adalah di antara cendikiawan
Arab Muslim yang berusaha menempuh jalan ini. Untuk tujuan ini, ia telah
membangun proyek pemikirannya yang diberinya nama Kritik Nalar Arab. Artikel
ini mencoba melihat perangkat konsep serta metode yang digunakannya dalam
kajian, yang dalam kajian ini ditemukan bahwa al-Jabiri banyak menderivasi
konsep dan metodenya dari mazhab pemikiran yang ada pada filsafat Barat,
terutama Marxisme dan Postmodernisme.
Kata Kunci: Turâts, Epistemologi, Peralatan Konseptual, Metodologi,
Kritik
Introduction
O
f the last fifty years, turâts has become one of the most heated
topics intensely debated in contemporary Arab Islamic thought.
It assumes a centre stage in the works of Arab and Muslim
intellectuals of various ideological and intellectual leanings. It becomes
a principal concern for comitted Muslims as well as for liberal and
secular Arab thinkers. For the former, turâts is seen a source of Arab-
Muslim strength from which present Arab Muslim societies can find
solution to their problems. The latter, however, sees it is this turâts
that has become a source of problem that has impeded the Arab
Muslim mind, hampered its material progress and thus precluded
its long-standing attempt at revival and renaissance. Their
involvement in turâts therefore aims at delegitmizing the claims of
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the former. They claim that Islmist reading of turats is ideological
and thus problematic. What we need is that, they claim, objective
and scientific reading of turâts which can be done by using various
conceptual and methodological apparatus available in different
schools of contemporary western philosophy and social sciences. It
is intrestingly to note the works of these latter scholars in their later
development have also become another ideological project, which is
basically done to find and found justification to their alien ideas.
They seemingly want to proclaim that what they preach are actually
not purely western or alien in Islamic thought, but firmly grounded
in its tradition.1
Among Arab scholars who have dealt intensively with the
subject, Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri (d. 2010) assumes a leading
position, He has written a umber of works on the subject, important
of which is of course his series of which consists of Takwîn al-‘Aql
al-‘Arabi (Formation of Arab Reason), Bunyah al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi
(Structure of Arab Reason), al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi al-Siyâsi (Arab Political
Reason), and al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi al-Akhlâqi (Ethical Arab Reason). Given
his considerbale contribution in this field, we therefore select him to
be subject of the study in this article. Jabari narrates that his interest
in turâts was initially stuck by the work of French orientalist Yves
Lacoste about Ibnu Khaldun. This book, he said, has a big claim
about Ibnu Khaldun where he is said as a leading Marxist figure or
at least, the one who defended the thesis of historical materialism.
But this sort of reading also widely spreads among Arab scholars. In
this respect, he particularly refers to ‘Ali Abd al-Wahid, the editor of
Muqaddimah, who pronounced Ibnu Khaldun as a father of social
and economic sciences. In other writings, this medieval Muslim
scholar is also described a pioneer of modern sociology similar to
August Comte. Triggered by this fact, he later decided to choose
Ibnu Khaldun as a topic of his doctorate dissertation. He wanted to
make a correction to this model of reading, which according to him
is ideological in nature. Jabiri wants to present Ibnu Khaldun as he
is, free from any referential authorities. This does not mean that he
declines to read or benefit from other sources available on the subject.
That is not his intention. He simply wants to deal with the thought
of this prominent intellectual figure as he has presented himself
1 Louay M. Safi, The Challenge of Modernity: The Quest for Authenticity in the Arab
World, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 173.
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through his works. Jabiri accentuates that this is the very method
that he applies in writing Critique of Arab Reason.2 What concerns
most this article, however, is not the ideas he propogates. It is largely
occupied with the conceptual apparatus he uses in his study.
The Place of Jabiri in Contemporary of Arab-Islamic Thought
Jabiri is no doubt one of interesting figure to date. It is not easy
to classify his school of thought. For, he has been in constant critical
engagement with all strands of thought, classical as well as modern
and contemporary. Almost none escapes from his criticism. He
severely criticizes al-Syafi’i, al-Ash‘ari, Ibnu Sina, al- Ghazali, al-Razi,
and many others. He holds these giant intellectual figures in Islamic
history responsible for the stagnation of Arab-Islamic thought. In al-
Khit }âb al-‘Arabi al-Mu‘âs }ir, he mercilessly attacks almost all major
modern and contemporary Arab thinkers ranging from Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, Rashid Ridha, to ‘Ali ‘Abd al-
Raziq, Salamah Musa, Anwar ‘Abd al-Malik, ‘Abd Rahman Badawi,
Taha Husayn, Zaki Najib Mahmud, Michel ‘Aflaq, ‘Abd Allah al-
Da’im, and Sayyid Qutb, denouncing them all as salafi and incapable
of rationally thinking of reality. What surprises more is that he even
criticizes such a doyen of Arab Marxist thinkers as ‘Abdullah ‘Arwi
with whom he shares same ideological conviction. Once he was
engaged in a serious debate with Hasan Hanafi, a widely known
founder of the Islamic Left (al-Yasar al-Islâmi).3 For this stance, Fawzi
Sha‘bi has described this Moroccan thinker as egoistic (fardaniyyah).4
Al-Misbahi was concerned that such an attitude may lead him to
believe that he is the only one to have a comprehensive and absolute
view (qawl syâmil al-mut }laq).5 This critical stance is supposed not
surprising at all since critique is the crux of his thought dominating
his publications and interviews. One writer describes him as, “a real
2 Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, al-Turâts wa al-H}adâtsah:Dirâsât wa Munâqasyât, (Beirut :
al-Markaz al-Tsaqâfi al-‘Arabi, 1991), 307-308.
3 Their discussion was later published in a book called H }iwâr al-Maghrîb wa al-
Maghrîb
4 ‘Imad Fawzi Sya‘bi, “al-Khit }âb al-‘Arabi al-Mu‘âs}ir li al-Kâtib Muh }ammad ‘Âbid al-
Jâbiri,” Dirâsât ‘Arabiyyah, No. 1&2, Nov-Dec 1983, 147.
5 Muhammad al-Misbahi,”Al-Jâbiri wa al-H}ilm al-Muzdawaj bi al-‘Aqlâniyyah,”  in
Kamal ‘Abd al-Latif (ed.), al-Turâts wa al-Nahd }ah: Qirâ’ât fi A‘mâl Muh }ammad ‘Âbid al-
Jâbirî, (Beirut: Markaz Dirâsât al-Wah}dah al-‘Arabiyyah, 2004), 190.
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living critic who hates to build a new building within existing
edifices.”6 In the eyes of Filal Ansari, he is “neither as a theologian
(an ‘alîm) nor a liberal Muslim whose aim would be to offer critical
or alternative views to the prevailing orthodoxy, nor even a modern
specialist of religion.” Jabiri attempts to portray himself as
transcending all existing schools, of which we are all still in doubt.
Jabiri’s Critique of Arab Reason is part of broader ambitious
project recently inaugurated by many contemporary Arab thinkers
as an attempt at Arab cultural revival and renewal. This is
undoubtedly a challenging work since it plans to undertake a
comprehensive overview of one thousand and four hundred years
Arab Islamic intellectual history. However, with erudition and
determination of its author, he finally managed to complete it. This
is indeed one of the greatest achievements which Jabiri achieved
throughout his intellectual career and an immense contribution to
the development of present Arab Islamic thought. This project has
been quite controversial and said to have “shaken contemporary
Arab thought on all of its theoretical levels and diverse intellectual
trends.”7 It is deemed as the latest and greatest assault in newly
emerging Arab critical movement which aims at affirming rationality
and removing irrationality from Arab life.
Significant of Jabiri’s Intellectual Project
Many may disagree with a number of proposition, assump-
tions, and interpretations Jabiri espouses throughout this work, but
one hardly denies a kind of creativity and innovativeness in his
dealing with the subject. He has produced some fresh and novel
ideas which sometimes not only challenge a mainstream view held
in classical Arab Islamic scholarship but also what is commonly
believed true in modern Islamic thought and orientalist intellectual
tradition. That is therefore no wonder why his work has sparked
fierce debate and raised an in-depth serious question, making its
author a subject of permanent criticism. A number of contemporary
Arab scholars and thinkers have come to respond to various ideas,
concepts, claims as well as allegations he made in his works.
6 Ibid., 189.
7 Mahmud Rawa’, Musykilah al-Nas }s } wa al-‘Aql fî al-Falsafah al-Islâmiyyah, (Beirut:
Dâr al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2006), 233-234.
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It is, however, worth mentioning that most criticism on him is
directed either on concepts and methodologies he devised or on
historical facts which he brought forward or on interpretation that
he made upon certain historical facts. Concerning his interpretation,
Nelly Lahoud has this to say: “Jabiri certainly gets the major names
and chronology of Islamic history right but the same cannot be said
about every aspect of his analysis of the events.”8 Rarely is heard
criticism on him based on religious consideration except on his latest
works on history of Qur‘an. He is never scandalized or blasphemed
like some of his contemporaries: Fazlur Rahman of Pakistan, Nasr
Hamid Abu Zayd of Egypt, Mahmud Muhammad Taha of Sudan,
and Muhammad Syahrur of Syria.
There are a number of possible reasons that account for this.
First, it could be due to the nature of the subject he deals which
belongs not to the areas considered sacred or sensitive in Islam. His
entry point to present Arab discourse is Arab Islamic tradition (turâts)
in general, and philosophy, a subject which interests not so many
‘ulama. He has no direct intervention in such subjects as the holy
Qur’an, theology, or Islamic law, except in passing remark.9 Only in
the last three years does he directly engage in discussing the holy
Qur’an. It is perhaps for this reason that many religious scholars do
not pay serious attention to his writings. His works are read mostly
by students of philosophy and by people of the same academic
background with him, some of whom are his colleagues and students
in the university where he is teachings. Nonetheless, one cannot deny
the implication of his study in the realm of religious thought, because
the very tradition which he discusses is the one that emanates and
revolves around the Qur’an and Sunnah. Therefore, although his
focus is turâts, the implication that it has on the field of Islamic studies
is inevitable.
Second, the reason likely goes to the socio-political climate of
Morocco which to some extent enjoys a certain degree of freedom
where different sorts of ideas could freely flow and people feel safe
to express whatever ideas they have.
8 Nelly Lahoud, Political Thought in Islam: A Study in Intellectual Boundaries, (London:
Routledge Curzon, 2005), 45.
9 His interest in the Qur’an surfaces only recently when he published his Madkhal
ilâ al-Qur’ân (2006), where he made some controversial claim about certain aspects of the
history of the Qur’an.
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Despite many criticisms addressed to him, most Arab
intellectuals, including his critics, hold him in a high accolade and
consider his work Critique of Arab Reasn as one of the best in the last
three decades. According to Hasan Hanafi, this project is one of the
most widely discussed topics in Egypt and that it has exerted
considerable influence on a good number of Egyptian young
generations. Nearly no young man in the country turns to be an
intellectual, Hanafi exaggeratedly assess, except that he already read
and dialogued with Naqd al-’Aql al-’Arabi.10 “Most Arab intellectuals
must have read Takwîn al-’Aql al-’Arabi, Bunyah al-’Aql al-’Arabi, al-
Turâts wa al-Hadâtsah, and al-Khit }âb al-‘Arabi al-Mu’âs }ir and in most
cases have been positively influenced by them,” states another writer.11
A leading Egyptian Marxist thinker, Mahmud Amin al-’Alim, when
commenting the first two volumes of this project, says that they really
constitute the most important and illuminating works ever produced
in the subject of critique of reason, either looked from scope,
comprehensiveness, profundity and deepness of their analysis of
different linguistic, legal, theological, and philosophical aspects of Arab
tradition, or from the brilliant conclusions he reached concerning this
tradition.12 His exposition of three epistemic systems of Islamic know-
ledge (bayâni, irfâni, and burhâni) is said to have furnished student
with clear concept about what turâts is. He is now equipped with a
chart to see where people are going about their relation to turâts.13
The work recently is enjoying a distinctive place “in the field
of the thinking of the problem of tradition in contemporary Arab
thought,”14 holding “a strong presence in Maghribi as well as Arab
cultural sphere,”15 and becoming one of the “classic” in contemporary
Arab thought.16 It has gone for several printings and been translated
10 Hasan Hanafi, “Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi fi Mir’ah “al-Turâth wa al-Tajdîd”,” in Kamal
‘Abd al-Latif (ed.), al-Turâts wa al-Nahd }ah…, 228.
11 Jamal Mafrah, “Naqd al-Jâbiri,” in Kamal ‘Abd al-Latif (ed.), 160.
12 Mahmud Amin al-’Alim, ”Mulâh}az}ât Manhajiyyah Tamhîdiyyah Hal Naqd al-Jâbiri
li al-’Aql al-’Arabi,”  al-Wah}dah, 51 (Desember 1988), 132.
13 al-Jabiri, al-Turâts wa al-H }adâtsah, 323.
14 Muhammad al-Misbahi, “al-Jâbiri wa al-H}ilm al-Muzdawaj bi al-‘Aqlâniyyah,” in
Kamal ‘Abd al-Latif (ed.), al-Turâts wa al-Nahd}ah…, 180.
15 Kamal ‘Abd al-Latif, Naqd al-‘Aql am Naqd al-Tawâfuq?, (Syiria : Dâr al-H}iwâr li al-
Nasyr wa al-Tawzî‘, 2002), 7.
16 Abdou Filali-Ansari, “Can Modern Rationality Shape a New Religiosity: Mohamed
Abed Jabri and the Paradox of Islam and Modernity,” in John Cooper, Ronald L. Nettler and
Mohamed Mahmoud (eds.), Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectual Respond, (London and
New York: I. B. Tauris, T.Th), 156.
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along with his other works into several languages like France, English,
Turkish, and Indonesia.17 There is no wonder then if Jabir Anshari
includes it in the list of ten influential literatures in the last twenty
five years in the Arab world.
Jabiri’s Conceptual Framework and Methodological Approach
What makes Jabiri’s oeuvre intriguing is actually not so much
the subject he deals. The fascination stems from the conceptual
apparatus he uses, which is said to be rich and diverse, anchored in
different intellectual sources and philosophical frameworks. In this
regard, Jabiri is said to have made a real “epistemological revolution”
(al-tsawrah al-ma’rifiyyah) in the study of Arab Islamic heritage.18
More specifically, he is credited for epistemological method that he
uses, which is, according to Mahmud Amin al-‘Alim, unprecedented
that enriches method of research in contemporary Arab thought.19
A prominent Lebanese critic, ‘Ali Harb, has a similar impression:
“when Jabiri devised an epistemological method in critiquing Arab
reason, he actually constructed a new mode of research in Arab
intellectual arena.”20 It is to this same method as well his very staunch
critic, George Tarabishi, appends the greatness of Jabiri. It is not due
to its sociological or psychological nature, says Tarabisihi, but rather
due to his strong theoretical foundation which he establishes to this
reason which enables him to elevate it from level of word (al-lafz })
and meaning (ma’nâ) to that of concept. In this regard, he preceded
many of the scholars who have written on the same subject.21 Although
this methodological aspect has come to be his credit, it is this very
same aspect that has become a source of problem in his study.
Throughout out his study, Jabiri has devised various concepts
and theories which he borrowed from diverse western philosophical
systems. Perhaps he is among Arab authors who pioneers who has
17 Formasi Nalar Arab, Trans. Imam Khori, (Yogyakarta: IRCISod, 2003), being a
translation of Takwin al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi; Post Tradisionalisme Islam, Trans. Ahmad Baso
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000).
18 Abd al-Ilah Balqaziz, “Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri,” in Kamal ‘Abd al-Latif (ed.), al-
Turâts wa al-Nahd }ah…, 70.
19 Mahmud Amin al-’Alim,  “Mulâh}az}ât Manhajiyyah Tamhîdiyyah H}awl Naqd al-
Jâbiri li al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi.”  al-Wah }dah (Dec 1988), no 51, 132.
20 ‘Ali Harb, Naqd al-Nas }s }, (Beirut: al-Markaz al-Tsaqâfi al-’Arabi, 1993), 117.
21 George Tarabishi, Naz }ariyyah al-‘Aql, Naqd Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi (1), (Beirut
and London: Dâr al-Saqi, 1999), 12.
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devised western conceptual apparatus in reading Islamic intellectual
history.
Right from the beginning of his Takwîn, Jabiri has shown his
indebtedness to numerous thinkers. In his attempt to explain what
reason is, he has made use of the concepts advanced by numerous
western thinkers of different disciplines. He resorts to a Swiss
developmental psychologist and philosopher, Jean Piaget (1896-1980),
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), an Austrian neurologist, and Lalande
(1867 – 1963), a French Philosopher. In defining the meaning of Reason,
he says that he has borrowed the idea from Lalande. But, George
Tarabishi objects if Jabiri’s definition stems from Lalande. According
to him, Jabiri’s quotation of Lalande’s view is misleading and does not
properly reflect what Lalande means in his original work. And that
happens primarily because Jabiri does not make direct accesses to
Lalande’s original book. He only uses secondary source.
Some of Jabiri’s conceptual apparatus can also be traced to
Marxism, a school which he says, “no contemporary thought can
breathe without it.” This Marxist impact is clearly seen especially in
his third trilogy, al-‘Aql al-Siyasi al-‘Arabi where he resorts much to
works of Althusser and Gramsci. From Gramsci, he borrows the the
notion of al-istiqlâl al-târîkhi al-tamm (complete historical
independence). His acquaintance with this school of thought goes
back to 1950s when he was still a university student. During this
time, he already read the works of Karl Marx, Angles, Lenin, and
their critics. He claims that it is this philosophy that had made a
great influence upon his thought which he later used to criticizing
modern and contemporary Arab discourse.
Looking as a whole, Jabiri’s philosophical thinking is very much
influenced and informed by contemporary French school of
epistemology.22 He largely draws on a rich archive of postcolonial
analysis, making an eclectic use of Bachelard, Foucault and Derrida.23
One of the concepts which he borrows from Bachelard is that of
epistemological rupture. Bachelard used the concept in two contexts,
one is to characterize the way scientific knowledge splits off from
and even contradicts common-sense experiences and beliefs. In this
regards, he says “scientific progress always reveals a break (rupture),
constant breaks, between ordinary (common) knowledge and
22 al-Jabiri, al-Turâts wa al-H }adâtsah, 288.
23 al-Jabiri, al-Khit }âb al-’Arabi al-Mu’âs }ir, 14.
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scientific knowledge.”24 Second, he devises the term to refute the
prevailing view which sees science progresses in continuous and linear
manner, where the latter follows the former. To him, scientific
progress is characterized by rupture and discontinuity where new
theory ruptures from previous theories; but such rupture takes place
within the same specific field of science.
This idea soon finds significant hearing in some philosophical
circles in the West, especially in France. It begins to be applied in
various disciplines. Canguilhem, a historian of physiological science
and himself is Bachelard’s student, deployes it to study history of
ideas. It later echoes in the writings of celebrated French
poststructuralist, Michel Foucault, from whom Jabiri also derives
many of his concepts. In his The Archeology of Knowledge, the author
of this book expresses his indebtedness to both Bachelard and
Canguilhem. He writes:
Beneath the great continuities of thought, beneath the solid,
homogenous manifestations of a single mind or a collective mentality,
beneath the stubborn development of a science striving to exist and
reach completion at the very outset, beneath the persistence of a
particular genre, form, discipline, or theoretical activity, one is now
trying to detect the incidence of interruption. Interruptions whose
status and nature vary considerably. These are the epistemological
acts and thresholds described by Bachelard.25
He continues to record:
There are the displacement and transformations of concepts: the
analyses of G. Canguilhem may serve as a model; they show that the
history of a concept is not wholly and entirely that of its progressive
refinement, its continuously increasing rationality, its abstraction
gradient, but that of its various fields of constitution and validity;
that of its various rules of use, that of the many theoretical contexts
in which it developed and matured.
Louis Althusser applies it to read the development of Karl
Marx’s thought. He is of view that the Old Karl Marx is not a
continuation of Young Karl Marx. It is said that Thomas Kuhn’s theory
24 Quoted from Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault’s Archeology of Scientific Reason,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 14.
25 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith,
(London: Routledge, 1991), 4.
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of paradigm shift is also influenced by Bachelard’s concept of
epistemological rupture.
It should be acknowledged that it is Jabiri perhaps the first
Arab thinker who devises this concept in reading and interpreting
Arab Islamic philosophy in particular and Islamic thought in general.
He began to deploy it in a conference on Ibn Rushd held in April
1978. He later elaborated it in the introduction of his book NaÍnu wa
al-Turâts and Takwîn al-’Aql al-’Arabi. When he firstly appealed to
the concept, it raged fierce debate and discussion among intellectuals.
Waqidi records, “when Jabiri presented his proposal by using the
notion of “rupture,” the participants were overwhelmed by a sense
of ambivalence. On one hand, there is no doubt that this proposal is
novel in that it could help us understand the history of Islamic
philosophy. However, on the other hand, the usage of the term does
not truly reflect the philosophy of Ibnu Rusyd in an acceptable
manner. That is because philosophy, in the eyes of some of them,
does not take a rupture from the general problem of Arab Islamic
philosophy.”26 No less than Hasan Hanafi, a leading contemporary
Egyptian philosopher, is also dragged into this polemic. He views
this idea as part of imperialist heritage which divides the Arab
Muslim world into the West as scientific and rational in nature, and
East, Sufistic, illuminative, and religious in character.27 The severest
critique that Jabiri received from the usage of this term is that he is
accused as “Maghribi chauvinist, fanatic to Maghrib.” He strongly
denies it and says “this (fanaticism) has no foundation at all, at least
in my thought, and my emotion.”28 Elsewhere he writes, “On what
is said about my fanaticism to Maghrîb, all have to know that I believe
that Maghrib is East (Masyrîq) and East is Maghrîb, both are
inseparable. We are brothers, sons of one father, but from different
mothers. We are twins, but brother.”29 In spite of such denial, it is
indeed difficult to dismiss such an accusation as his writings affirm
otherwise as can be seen throughout his discussion.
26 Muhammad Waqidi, H }iwâr Falsafi: Qirâ’ah Naqdiyyah fi al-Falsafah al-‘Arabiyyah
al-Mu’âs }irah, (T.K: al-Dâr al-Bayda, 1985), 135.
27 Hasan Hanafi and Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri, H }iwâr al-Masyrîq wa al-Maghrîb,
(Beirut: al-Mua’assasah al-‘Arabiyyah li al-Dirâsât wa al-Nasyr, 1990), 7. A critique of this
dialogue see: Mahmud Isma‘il, Fî Naqd H }iwâr al-Masyrîq wa al-Maghrîb bayn H }anafi wa al-
Jâbiri, (al-Qâhirah: Ru’yah li al-Nasyr wa al-Tawzî‘, 2005).
28 Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri, Nah}nu wa al-Turâts, (al-Maghrîb: al-Markaz al-Tsaqâfi
al-‘Arabi, 1985), 261.
29 Hasan Hanafi and Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri, H}iwâr al-Masyrîq wa al-Maghrîb, 145.
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Jabiri criticizes a common view that looks into the development
of philosophy in the Muslim world as a continuation process. He
refuses to consider philosophy of Ibnu Bajah, Ibnu Tufayl, and Ibnu
Rusyd as extension of the philosophy of al-Kindi, Farabi, and Ibnu
Sina, insisting such a view needs to be revisited. He underlies that
philosophy in the East develops and breathes within a milieu
dominated by theology and its fundamental problem of conciliation
between reason and revelation. In such a situation, philosophy is
simply assigned to defend doctrinal beliefs with rational arguments.30
The socio-political and cultural setting in the West, however, took a
different turn. Here theology is not dominant. Therefore, there is no
anxiety as felt in the east of having to reconcile reason and revelation,
and religion and philosophy. “Free from “eastern format” of Neo
Platonist has emancipated the same discourse from employing
science to merge religion into philosophy and vice versa, something
which eastern school of philosophy was engaged in.”31 Andalusian
philosophy, claims Jabiri, is grounded on science, mathematics, and
logic and this is that has molded it scientific and “secular”
philosophy.32 It is this very fact, Jabiri claims, that has forced him as
a historian to delink Ibnu Rusyd with Ibnu Sina. Ibnu Sina may
represent the peak of philosophy in the East, but Ibnu Rusyd is neither
a completion nor a continuation of him, but rather a revolution
against him. Ibnu Sina is a well known Gnostic and Ibnu Rusyd
revolted against it.33 There are then two spirits of thought in Arab
Islamic heritage: one is Avicennian and other Averroist. Or put it
more generally, there are two schools of thought, one eastern and
another western, both are epistemologically in rupture.34
This rupture is first observed by Ibnu Bajah in the field of
philosophy. It is then continued by Ibnu Tufayl, and generalized by
Jabiri to all Andalusian and Maghribi thinkers. Ibnu Hazm is seen to
have broken from eastern Islamic intellectual tradition for his strong
opposition to Shi‘ite and Sufi Gnosticism as well as Ash‘arite doctrine
that allows the occurrence of super natural (khawâriq) and divine
grace (karâmât). He vehemently objected to blind imitation (taqlîd)
30 al-Jabiri, Nah}nu wa al-Turâts, 173.
31 Ibid., 177-178.
32 Ibid., 174.
33 al-Jabiri, al-Turâts wa al-H }adâtsah, 262.
34 al-Jabiri, Nah}nu wa al-Turâts, 328.
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and proclaimed that, “no one is allowed to imitate someone else,
living or dead, but each must perform an independent reasoning
(ijtihâd) to the best of his ability.” A layman is not allowed to follow
blindly a mufti, even companions of the prophets, or the founders
of legal schools of thought as “all of them would free themselves of
him, in the world and hereafter.” For him, knowledge can be only
accessed either through reason (al-‘aql) or sense (al-t}iss).35 Ibnu Hazm
is well reputed for his strong position against a Syafi‘i and jurists’
typical analogy as they compare between two things of different kind
(naw‘). To him qiyâs is only valid on two things of the same kind.36
Unlike Syafi‘i, he seeks to establish bayân on logic principle which
rests upon logical rules and axioms like conclusion necessarily follows
from two premises, moving from universal to particular, etc. He
strongly opposed to the notion of rationization (ta‘lîl) upon which
juristic analogy is based.37
Ibnu Hazm’s thought was carried forward by Ibnu Rusyd and
later accomplished by Syatibi. According to Jabiri, Syatibi has created
an epistemological transformation (naqlah ibistimûlûjiyyah) in Arab
expository juristic system. His important contribution lies in his
attempt to develop three important methodological steps: deduction
(istintâj), induction (istiqrâ’), and objectives of Syariah (maqâs }id
syarî’ah). Jabiri claims this famous has been derived by Syatibi from
Ibnu Rusyd: “Syatibi took this idea from Ibnu Rusyd, who had
employed it in the area of doctrine, then transferred it to the realm
of us }ûl, that is, the fundamentals of jurisprudence.” Instead of relying
on text, Syatibi urged to construct Us}ûl Fiqh on principle of objectives
of Syariah. By so doing, Shatibi, claims Jabiri, has established an
epistemological rupture with Syafi‘i.38
His interpreation of history of Islamic philosophy described is
not without cricism. To say that philosophical tradition in the
Andalusia is not a continution of philosophy of the East is hardly to
prove. His interpretation of Islamic legal history is also another point
which raised problem. In his work Naz }ariyyah al-Maqâs }id ‘Ind al-
Syât}ibi, Ahmad Raysini challangges Jabiri’s claim. In his research, he
finds that Ghazali is among the scholars which Syatibi mentions by
35 al-Jabiri, Takwîn, 308-309.
36 Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri, Bunyah al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi, Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi (2),
(Beirut: Markaz Dirâsât al-Wah}dah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1992), 518.
37 al-Jabiri, Takwîn, 305.
38 al-Jabiri, Bunyah, 540.
Nirwan Syafrin236
Jurnal TSAQAFAH
name several times, at least about forty times. This is in addition to
reference that Shatibi makes to this scholar by using personal
pronoun. It is followed by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi with Syatibi much
debated, then Juwayni, al-Qarafi, and Ibnu ‘Abd al-Salam.39 If that is
the case, how it is possible for Jabiri then to claim that Syatibi has
made an epistemological break with his predecessors in the East.
Apart from Bachelard, Jabiri has also made use of the concept
advanced by Michel Foucault. This can be very clearly seen from his
definition of Arab reason. Jabiri asserts that he understands reason
in the context of his study as an system of knowledge (al-niz }âm al-
ma’rifi) similar to Focault’s episteme, that is,
the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive
practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and
possibly formalized systems… the episteme is not a form of knowledge
or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries of the most
varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or
a period; it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a
given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the
level of discursive regularities.40
Jabiri makes modification to the concept and defines it (al-
niz }âm al-ma’rifi) as “a set of concepts, principles, procedures that
gives knowledge in any historical phase its unconscious structure.”
Here he links the notion of episteme to unconscious structure of
culture.41 By structure, he means the principle of permanent
(tsawâbit) and changing (mutaghayyir). The structure (bunyah) of
Arab reason means therefore the permanent and changing of Arab
culture. The relationship between culture and reason becomes much
clearer here.
This is, however, not to deny his intellectual indebtedness to
other scholars. He admits that he has read Descartes, Spinoza,
Leibniz, Hume of western philosophy, as he read Plato and Aristotle,
and, with great interest Ibnu Khaldun, Ghazali, Ibnu Rusyd, Farabi,
Ibnu Sina, and others, and even acknowledged them as his teacher
from whom he learned a lot. Yet, he maintains, what he learned
from them is what he forgot. And it is this forgotten thing which he
applies in his study, because it has become part of his unconscious
39 Ahmad Raysani, Naz }ariyyah al-Maqâsid ‘Inda al-Syât}ibi, 319 & 321.
40 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 191.
41 Ibid., 37
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epistemic construct, which he cannot properly ascribe to “which
father” it belongs to.42
Whether it is a standard answer among contemporary Arab
thinkers or otherwise, it is still worthwhile to note that we find a
similar comment given Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd when asked whether
he is influenced by post modernist thinking. He states:
I cannot deny that I have read all of this literature in philosophy and
social science. But I suspect very much that I could be applying certain
rules. I did not elect also… Not because I ignore them, I read something
and it absorbed in my mind. What comes out of this is something
different. Something that is me. Of course, I learn from every source,
but I am not satisfied with one kind of interpretation. Of course, you
could say that there are some elements [of postmodern writers], but
it is very hard to define what kind of elements are there in my writing.
You could not say, “here, it is Foucault, or here it is someone else. It is
very difficult, because I do not read to take principles and apply them
blindly. I read to widen my horizon and to learn the different possible
ways of looking at things.43
Jabiri is certainly not the first and only thinker making an
appeal to French philosophical tradition. A number of other North
African scholars, thinkers, and philosophers also do the same. This
includes a French-Algerian born scholar Arkoun, Fathi al-Turki,
Muta‘ Safdi, ‘Abd al-Salam bin ‘Abd al-‘Ali, ‘Ali Umlil, Nur al-Din
Afayah, ‘Ali Harb, Hasan Hanafi, Hisyam Dja‘it, Abdullah ‘Arwi,
Salim Yafut, ‘Abd Kabir al-Khatibi, and many others. Perhaps inspired
by Michel Foucault’s Archeology of Knowledge, Salim Yafut, the
translator of the book, even comes to name his two books Hafriyât
al-Ma‘rifah al-‘Arabiyyah al-Islâmiyyah44 and Hafriyât al-Istisyrâq
respectively.45 In the last few years, French post modernist thinking
has indeed made an in-depth penetration in North African Islamic
42 al-Jabiri, al-Turâts wa al-H }adâtsah, 322.
43 Interview with Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, June 2, 1999, quoted from Moch Nur
Ichwan, A New Horizon in Qur’anic Hermeneutics: Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd’s Contribution to
Critical Qur’anic Scholarship (unpublished Master thesis, Leiden University, 1999), 126.
44 For a detailed elaboration of Foucault’s influence on contemporary Arab thought,
one can consult Zawawi Bughurah, Michel Foucault fî al-Fikr al-’Arabi al-Mu’âs }ir, (Beirut:
Dâr al-T}alî‘ah, 2001).
45 Salim Yafut, Hafriyât al-Istisyrâq fî Naqd al-‘Aql al-Istisyrâqi, (Beirut: al-Markaz al-
Tsaqâfi al-Arabi, 1989). Hafriyât is a word used in Arabic to refer to archeology.
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thought.46 This is indicated at least by a substantial amount of French
philosophical literatures written by Michel Foucault, Derrida, Paul
Ricour, and others translated into Arabic. A number of articles and
books discussing ideas and concepts developed by those scholars
are also widely circulated.47
According to Jabiri there are at least two reasons that account
for this phenomenon. One is subjective referring to the fact that
Maghrib was a French colony. People here are more closely attached
to French culture than to Anglo-Saxon or other cultures. Second factor
is objective related to the nature of French school of epistemology
itself. He observes French epistemological studies are more concerned
with universal historical analysis and philosophical rationalist critique
than with forms. And that suits to the subject he deals: turâts.
Jabiri is aware of the possible criticism resulting from his usage
of these foreign concepts. He first of all might be charged as being
inconsistent. That is because he has been vocal in criticizing Arab
Marxists and liberals for taking the west as their system of referential
authority. By invoking western concepts, he himself has committed
the same mistake, thus betraying the spirit of complete historical
independence which he champions. He, however, refutes this
critique. He explains historical independence does not mean that
we have to turn or shun away from interacting with western
civilization. What is needed is that we have to deal with it in critical
and conscious manner that allows us to have control over it, and use
it in accordance to our needs. It is not the other way around where
we are absorbed and merged into the subject. He admits that
concepts that originate from western social sciences are intimately
related to western culture and thought, yet he believes they express
general condition of human being. What is important is that how to
contextualize and fit them to our circumstances and culture. If we
succeed to do that, they then become ours. It is as though that we
46 See for instance, Ahmad ‘Abd al-Halim ‘Atiyyah, “al-Tafkîk wa al-Ikhtilâf: Jacques
Derrida wa al-Fikr al-‘Arabi al-Mu’âs}ir”, in Mahmud Amin al-’Alim, al-Fikr al-’Arabi ‘ala Masyârif
al-Qarn al-H }âdi wa al-’Isyrîn, (al-Qâhirah: Qad }âya Fikriyyah lî al-Nasyr wa al-Tawzî’, 1995),
159- 199; For a detailed elaboration of Foucault’s influence on contemporary Arab thought,
one can consult, Zawawi Bughurah, Michel Foucault fî al-Fikr al-’Arabi al-Mu’âs }ir.
47 In his footnote, Zawawi Baghurah provides a list of Michel Foucault’s works
which has been translated into Arabic and several other Arabic books and articles which
discuss this figure. See Zawawi Bughurah, Michel Foucault fî al-Fikr al-’Arabi al-Mu’âs }ir, 15,
footnote 1.
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have invented the concepts, because they express reality of not others
but of ours. In such a way, we actually have exercised an historical
independence.
Jabiri further argues that the process of transporting particular
concepts from its origin to another is not a new enterprise; it is a
common practice observed in almost all field of sciences, especially
modern human sciences. Prior to nineteenth century all sciences
were bound under the rope of philosophy. However, following the
vast progress and development of mathematics and natural sciences,
each of these sciences separated from its origin and subsequently
became independent subjects. But what is interesting to notice, says
Jabiri, is that in spite of such separation, for quite sometimes they
remain to copy the pattern of one another. Being the highest model
of rationality, mathematics has served as a paradigm that each science
wishes to follow. Physics, for instance, became an independent
discipline when it formulated itself in a model similar to that of
mathematics. Now physics becomes a “mathematical formulation
of natural phenomenon.” Following this, it also transported some
new concepts from the sphere of mathematics to its own field, using,
for instance, algebra and engineering and even formulating its
principles in mathematical format.48
Sociology is another case in point. If physics takes mathematics
as its model, sociology emulates physics. It is for this reason August
Comte, the founder of the discipline, calls this science as “the physic
of society.” But for Jabiri this discipline rather illustrates an aborted
attempt of concept transformation. For it fails to contextualize the
concepts it borrows to fit to the new ground where they are applied.
Some proponents of this discipline go too far, treating social
panorama exactly the same as that of physical phenomenon, hence
failing to take into consideration peculiar dimension of human society.
In other words, they have subjugated their subject for the sake of
concept. In so doing, they actually deformed reality and transgressed
scientific truth. In this case they are similar to Arab Marxist Salafi
who imposes a certain concept to Arab society in order to explain a
reality which is not its own.49
48 Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri, al-Mutsaqqafûn fi al-H }ad }ârah al-‘Arabiyyah: minh }ah
Ibn Hanbal wa nakbah Ibn Rusyd, (Beirut: Markaz Dirâsât al-Wah }dah al-’Arabiyyah, 1995),
11.
49 Ibid., 12.
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Furthermore, Jabiri explains that transforming certain concepts
to the field which is not of their origin is legitimate only there is a
need calling for it. For instance, in a situation where particular
discipline cannot produce a certain desired results except with the
help of other concept which is not its own. In this condition,
appropriating foreign concepts is completely justified. Jabiri, however,
quickly reminds that even in this situation, problem still persists if
those transmitted concepts are not properly contextualized (t }abyi’ah
al-mafâhim) and made suited to the new field where they are
transmitted.50 In other words, only when they are successfully being
contextualized, the process of transportation can be conducted.
Otherwise, it would be considered failure. So, t }abyi’ah (contextuali-
zation) holds a key position in this process.
What is contextualization meant? Jabiri explains that it is an
attempt at establishing an organic link between the transported
concept (al-mafhûm al-manqûl) and the area to which it is transmitted
in a manner that it gives the new concept legitimacy and authority
within the new field where it is transported. But to do this, one is
required to comprehend the original sources of the concept to be
transported: how is it constructed and what stages that it has gone
through. In other words, one should have sufficient knowledge about
historical development of the concept.51 “So what is required from
what we transform, whether it relates to ideas and theories, systems
and institutions, is an effort to contextualize them among ourselves,
and plant them in our land in a way that makes (them) organically
related to our historical reality.”52
Does it mean that Jabiri’s usage of the concepts is purely
pragmatic? Jabiri answers in negative tone. In his view, the choice of
method does not lie in hand of researcher; it is determined by the
nature of the subject and the objective intended to achieve. There is
nothing wrong if anyone wants to create new method for his study,
because principally method is nothing but simply “concepts which
researcher deploys to treat his subject and the way they are applied.”
They may come up from any sources; they could originate from
within the subject itself, purposely created, or borrowed from other
50 Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri,  Wijhah Naz}r, (Beirut: Markaz Dirâsat al-Wah}dah al-
‘Arabiyyah, 1992), 80.
51 al-Jabiri, al-Mutsaqqafûn fi al-H }ad }ârah al-‘Arabiyyah, 14.
52 al-Jabiri, Wijhah Naz }r, 80.
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disciplines. But what is important is that once one opts for the third
choice, he should elaborate and clarify it so that readers will not
misunderstand or mislead. He may add new elements to it which it
does not cover before, or if he wants he can strip it from what
originally it contains.53 In other words, he has to deal with those
concepts as mujtahidûn (independent thinkers) not blind imitators
(muqallidûn), embarking from a position of “complete historical
independence.”54 Here, Jabiri declares that he does not need to follow
in the footstep of Foucault in every inch of his step.55 “I do not limit
myself to the constraints present in the original framework, but often
utilize them with considerable freedom...we should not consider
those concepts molds east in iron, but tools to be used in each instance
in most productive way.”56 Jabiri believes that methods are basically
neutral or value free. They fully depend on how we use them. They
do not affect our analyses or studies, nor do they influence the
conclusions we intend to reach, for we are not duty bound to follow
the same limitations as they are set within their original perspective.
In this context, Jabiri seems to dismiss the role of worldview in
shaping one’s epistemology and methodology. Recent studies have
proved how culture has an important role in constructing one’s
knowledge as proved by many sociologists of knowledge like Imre
Lakatos, Thomas Kuhn, and others. Before his death, Abdelwahhab
M. Elmessiri edited a book which carries a title Epistemological Bias
in Physical and Social Sciences published by The International Institute
of Islamic Thought (2006) where he brought various writers to prove
how different elements that inherent in human like culture, religion
and others indeed exert significant influence upon one’s conception
of knowledge
However, due to diversity of sources of the concepts Jabiri uses,
it is not rarely each of these concepts and methods sometimes
contradict with each other. This is what Ibrahim Mahmud notes. He
questions how does he mix and blend Marx with Freud, Foucault,
Nietzsche, and Bachelard? How does he combine all these concepts?
We know that each of this method has concepts which distinguish
53 Ibid., 14.
54 Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri, al-‘Aql al-Siyâsi al-‘Arabi, Muh }addidâtuhu wa
Tajalliyâtuhu. Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi (3), (Beirut: Markaz Dirâsat al-Wah }dah al-‘Arabiyyah,
1992), 44.
55 al-Jabiri, Takwîn, 55.
56 al-Jabiri, al-Khit }âb al-’Arabi al-Mu’âs }ir, 14.
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it.57 Yet it is here where the strength as well as the weakness of Jabiri
lies. He can transcend the conflicting nature of the concepts, combine
and modify them in a way that he wishes them to be, so that they
can suit to the subject that he deals, and be applied in productive
and fruitful manner. This is exactly what Mahmud Amin al-‘Alim
found when reading Jabiri’s Naqd al-‘Aql al-Siyâsi. Here he sees that
Jabiri can free himself from fixed axioms of method of scientific
research (in a way that allows him) to construct pragmatic concepts
which he benefits not only from tradition of scientific methodology
in contemporary western studies, while attempting to affirm and
adapt them to the demands of particular Arab reality, and but also
from Arab classical heritagial concepts.58 Kamsl Abdul Latif affirms
this observation and asserts that Jabiri, “applies them in much more
independent.” He sees that the concept in Jabiri’s works, “gains a
particular character; it is really related to references whose general
characteristics and central connotations were already defined.
However, it receives other dimensions the moment it is newly
applied;” For Jabiri does not transform any concept without “taking
care of the demands of conditions and situations.” ‘Abd Latif finally
concludes that Jabiri is critically aware of the “necessity of
contextualizing the concepts used in order to make them in accord
with given substance particular to local history.”59
Conclusion
There is a widespread assumption held by many contemporary
Arab Muslim, intellectuals, especially of those with liberal and secular
inclination, that classical Islamic methodology laid down by Ulama of
the past is no longer sufficient to deal with complicated problems
facing present Muslim society. This insufficiency is partly, they claim,
due to the nature of that methodology itself which is ideological. For
this reason, these scholars call for establishing new methodologies. In
doing this, they have relied mostly on methods and concepts which
currently develop in contemporary western philosophy and social
sciences. And Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri is one of today leading Arab
57 Ahmad Madi, “Ghayd min Fayd Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jâbiri,” 85.
58 Mahmud Amin al-‘Alim, Mawâqif Naqdiyyah min al-Turâts, (Beirut: Dâr al-Fârâbi,
2004), 79.
59 Kamal ‘Abd al-Latif, Qirâ’ât fî al-Falsafah al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mu’âs }irah, 110.
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scholars who observes this practice. Throughout his work, he has
devised various conceptual apparatus from different schools of thought
of western philosophy. As the study indicates that he is heavily
influenced by French scholarship of postmodernist strand and also
by Marxism, although he himself claims that none of these school of
thought enjoys authoritative upon his mind. Jabiri claims that he has
modified those concepts to suit the subject he deals. Here, Jabiri seems
to dismiss a close link between methods and epistemology, thus with
worldview. Many scholars found that Jabiri does not fully succeed in
his attempt at contextualizing those foreign methods. As a result of
this, it is not difficult for anyone to see contradiction in his conclusion.[]
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